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Problem of universals
The problem of universals is an ancient question from metaphysics that has inspired a range of philosophical topics and disputes: "Should the properties an object has in common with other objects, such as color and shape, be considered to exist beyond those objects? And if a property exists separately from objects, what is the nature of that existence?"[1]
The problem of universals relates to various inquiries closely related to metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, as far back as Plato and Aristotle, in efforts to define the mental connections a human makes when they understand a property such as shape or color to be the same in nonidentical objects.[2]
Universals are qualities or relations found in two or more entities.[3] As an example, if all cup holders are circular in some way, circularity may be considered a universal property of cup holders.[4] Further, if two daughters can be considered female offspring of Frank, the qualities of being female, offspring, and of Frank, are universal properties of the two daughters. Many properties can be universal: being human, red, male or female, liquid or solid, big or small, etc.[5]
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Philosophers agree that human beings can talk and think about universals, but disagree on whether universals exist in reality beyond mere thought and speech.
- ^ Moreland, J.P. (2001). Universals. McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 0773522697.
- ^ Klima, Gyula (2017). "The Medieval Problem of Universals". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 2019-02-26.
- ^ Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 214. ISBN 978-0-19-924377-8.
- ^ Loux (1998), p. 20; (2001), p. 3
- ^ Loux (2001), p. 4
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